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Without specifying its meaning or context, openness remains an empty category.
It commonly evokes a positive sentiment, but what does it mean to say: We
are opening up this or that? And what does it disguise? It even compares with
excellence in this respect: a word that is en vogue to be thrown into debates about
the future of the academy. It can be claimed, in this sense, that we are excellent in
our scholarship if we produce more information, and we are more excellent if this
information is open. We are also more democratic if we are open since we share our
information. Sharing can also be patronizing if some opaque practice is responsible
for its execution and for the institution more generally. It may blind us in seeing our
condescension since all we see is our excellence. But then, you cannot have it all.
In the end, we are just humble servants to the academic institution, focussed on
negotiating knowledge and understanding within our discourse communities. At least
we share. But can we do better?
Being within scholarly discourses—or aspiring to be so as a young scholar—may
bring with it not only the responsibility of making justified knowledge claims as
an authorial speaker. It may also comprise of a responsibility to make the terms
on which I and others are able to be an author—and so to be within a discourse
community, being heard by an audience that does not hear others—transparent
and comprehensible. This may mean that openness needs to be more than mere
sharing of information. It means allowing anyone the potential to participate at least
in the sense of clarifying the various shibboleths required—in the manifold ways
such shibboleths can exist.
Openness as Sharing
We may look at the matter of openness through the lens of accessibility. There are
in essence two instances of accessibility in scholarly communication: accessing
the results of past discourses and accessing ongoing (or: future) discourses in
their making. The former may simply be called sharing; the latter may allude to
participation more fundamentally. The former means denying outsiders the , since
the sharing of information is claimed to be enough; the latter means making the
shibboleth comprehensible.
All too often, the debate on open access focuses sternly on the former. It is in this
sense that open access is said to allow anyone to become a knower, to understand
the world by accessing the knowledge produced in the closed circles of academic
institutions. The tax-payer argument is often invoked. It claims that the people
who fund the academic endeavour should at least have access to the produced
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information. This is a dubious way of understanding scholarly discourse. It suggests
that access to information suffices to enable an individual to become knowledgeable,
or even to become an active knower. But the highly specialised scholarly discourses
only allow a fraction of the, as it were, plebeian masses to participate even
passively in discourse and engage in the complexity of negotiating knowing and
understanding. Even the well-versed professor on matters constitutional will not be
able to do much with access to scholarly articles on atherosclerotic cardiovascular
disease if she arrives with chest pain, cold-sweated, at the hospital. Much rather,
of course, it should be her cardiologist—educated so as to understand it—who
should be able to access these articles without bureaucratic friction or economic
constraint. That is, any cardiologist should be able to get acquainted with the newest
information in her area, even though she works at the small, rural hospital without
a subscription to Nature or Science. This should be true irrespective of borders so
that the tax-payer argument seems irrelevant in this instance. It should be a matter of
solidarity—the ideal of a we-ness that binds us in being human—that we share such
information. It is therefore not condescending to claim that only a fraction will be able
to grasp the discourse; but this claim must by no means prevent us from sharing.
And yet, is this already the potential of openness that is so often being voiced?
The focus on open access, particularly gold open access, has manifested the
idea that the change of the way we communicate our knowing and understanding
concerns sharing more than anything else. It is a focus on the narrow sense of
accessibility. It resulted the stunning efforts of establishing publishing venues
alongside funding opportunities and hundreds of open access management staff.
It actually changed not much other than immediate access to information. We are
seeing this particularly with the rhetoric of transformative agreements, Plan S,
or Project DEAL in Germany. These developments require substantial financial
investment and a shifting of budgets: millions of Euros (or Pound, Dollar, etc.)
are being used to reduce or side-line the use of SciHub or the informal sharing of
articles. All along, however, they solidify practices of the making of discourse. In both
national and global contexts, openness should have a more fundamental meaning in
order to be actually meaningful, lest it be just a solidification of the practices as they
existed already decades ago + sharing.
Openness as Participation
If we consider openness to be more fundamental, it needs to be meaningful in the
sense of participation, instead of just sharing. Participation should comprise of being
able to participate in the making of the discourse, or at least to comprehend its
terms.
The Budapest Declaration—a milestone on the way towards open access—claims
accessibility improves the sharing of ‘the learning of the rich with the poor and the
poor with the rich’. However, this focus on sharing, its benign notion of publishing
better simply by publishing open access, does not much to counter injustices in a
global context. Much rather, it constructs a myth of a democratisation of knowledge.
Such injustices can appear in different guises. We may find testimonial injustice
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which means that groups of scholars are pre-emptively silenced. Especially in
the social sciences or humanities there are hermeneutic injustices in that the
experiences of some social groups in a collective are not reflected in and through
interpretive schemes of that collective, for those social groups do not contribute to
the collective’s hermeneutical resources. Or epistemic objectification which refers to
an exclusion of individuals while they are regarded as objects of epistemic inquiry.
With the push of debates of academic imperialism, post-colonialism, and efforts of
democratisation, such injustices have come to the discursive forefront in the context
of a global production of knowledge. In such a context, the dissemination of North
American and European information alongside the Western publishing model needs
to be seen critically since non-Western scholars often do not participate. Western
discourse practices function as the shibboleth to being able to shape how and what
is being known. The case of China is instructive as Chinese scholars were paid a
bonus if they published in well-ranked Western journals (instead of contributing to
the better ranking of domestic journals).
Power and hegemonic imbalances within the geopolitics of knowledge production
thwart the ideals of inclusiveness of a global production of knowledge. Especially
in the context of New Public Management and neoliberal agendas, nations are
positioned to compete themselves to attract excellent staff, excellent students, and
ultimately, foster excellent conditions for a nation’s economy to innovate. There
is no aim for a global production of knowledge in this context, at least not in the
sense of an inclusiveness since excellence requires individual superiority which is
exclusive by nature (as opposed to quality). There are only national productions
of knowledge then. And they are, of course, in competition with each other so
that fostering a constructed excellence nationally becomes a necessity. This can
be seen in various contexts, from the UK’s Research Excellence Framework to
Germany’s Exzellenzstrategie, or academia’s mode of hyper-competition in the wake
of excellence more broadly. It seems only legible for such an agenda to increase
a nation’s visibility by pushing its dissemination with the means of open sharing—
withholding the shibboleth but showcasing one’s knowledgeability.
And yet, even within a national context—irrespective of global injustices—openness
has a potential beyond the mere sharing of past discourse. Discourse communities
have a responsibility for engaging with this potential. This particularly concerns
the transparency of the practices through which discourse comes to existence:
gatekeeping—the decision-making of being published or not—needs to be open
so that it is made comprehensible to all why someone is considered a legitimate
participant and someone else is not.
Making the Terms of Participation
Transparent
Gatekeeping usually takes place in the form of editorial decision-making, supported
by information gathered through peer review. Editors are often not knowledgeable
or specialised enough to claim the position to judge on the quality or potential of a
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paper (which, of course, does not hinder some to judge anyway). Critics may argue
in this instance: why do we need gatekeeping in the first place? Why only make the
shibboleth transparent—why not abolish it? All should be able to participate, one
may claim; the technological means allow us to facilitate this. You cannot argue
against technology, of course. But gatekeeping does not depend on technology.
Some sort of filtering seems necessary since a communicative locus needs to
concentrate a community—an audience in the sense of a gathering of authors
and readers who interact. Dissolving discourse communities would help neither
those inside, nor those not allowed in—for there will no longer be a boundary at
all. In reality, of course, a community would move on to new shores and find their
communicative locus where they can discuss freely among themselves (“freely”
in the sense of freed from the intruder who aims to abolish their community).
Nevertheless, if we consider participation to be a meaningful communicative
practice there is the obligation to at least clarify the terms of being involved in the
communication and, thus, a member of this discourse community.
Openness may in the sense mean making transparent why, or why not, a
contribution is being published, and who has contributed to the contribution (in the
sense of reviewers who become co-authors by suggesting substantial changes). For
being an (aspiring) participant in a discourse requires being able to reconstruct its
coming to existence as well as the terms on which anyone will be able to contribute.
It is in this sense that we need to acknowledge that gatekeeping, particularly what
happens during peer review processes, still is a black box. There are manifold
manifestations of peer review. It is impossible for outsiders to comprehend what
actually takes place. This does not even pertain the notion of the blind review (which
is a difficult practice in itself). It suggests that the position of the contributor is not
considered—in review shall only be the information to be contributed. We should
remain suspicious whether this is really possible, especially in the humanities and
social sciences. The difficulty really steps in as the practices remain opaque even
after the decision has been made. Does it not seem unjustified as a discourse
community to accept that the boundaries of their epistemic negotiation are based
on the judgement of unknown judges? Moreover, it is based on an unintelligibility
about whether due judgement has taken place, or whether the author simply knew
the editor. We may also ask, as many have witnessed: was the rejection of my
colleague’s paper really based on the lack of clarifying his methodology, or rather
because of her unpleasant, provocative argument?
The imprint of this has been peer-reviewed is often used as an argument for
transparency, while it actually opposes it. It claims that the practice is transparent
since it is a rigorous, scholarly judgement of the contribution in the context of the
publisher’s standards. This is also claimed to indicate to outsiders: if contributions
are not accepted, this is because of real standards (and, of course, not because
it was a deviant author). This imprint is invading all areas of scholarship, but what
it is rarely stated what it really means in praxis. Scholars know all too well what
range of reviewing there exists: from the really helpful engagement with one’s text
to the adversarial one-liner that clearly shows the reviewer has not looked beyond
the abstract. Making this practice transparent by publishing reports will only help
improve it and strengthen the community, its discourse, and its value for society.
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This transparency is an essential meaning of openness that seems existential if
we see the potential of openness in participation instead of the mere sharing of
information. It means making the shibboleth comprehensible in constant practice, so
that anyone can fathom how a discourse community was formed by contributing to it,
and what is required of me to make myself heard, too. In the end, allowing anyone—
with the potential to justifiably contribute: claimed scholarly standards—being heard
—irrespective of symbolic capital or social esteem—marks one of the fundaments of
rational discourse. If we do not make use of this openness, we may ask ourselves,
what do we have to disguise.
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